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Theme: 1: This analysis reviews the effects of climate change in Africa, the response 
measures undertaken in the continent and the expected position of African countries at 
the meeting at Cancún, Mexico.2 
 
 
Summary: The analysis first provides an overview of climate change impacts in Africa. It 
begins with a brief review of general climate projections for Africa, with their overall 
impacts. Later, it moves on to assess specific climate impacts of the continent’s climate 
zones. The paper uses a sample of African countries to provide specific details of 
vulnerability in accordance with national circumstances. Secondly, the analysis looks at 
the policies implemented so far, or foreseen, in Africa, to respond to the climate threats 
previously reviewed. The analytical framework proposed is in line with the approach 
followed in the Bali Action Plan, which was established ahead of last year’s Copenhagen 
summit. That is, it reviews measures undertaken to respond to climate change in terms of 
mitigation actions, adaptation responses, technology interventions and finance provisions. 
This section briefly concludes with an overview of the contributions of Spain and the EU to 
these measures, before and after Copenhagen. Against this background, the third section 
of the analysis looks at the negotiating position of Africa in the aftermath of COP-15. 
Namely, it looks at the demands of the Africa Group and other relevant alliances within 
the continent, for consideration in Cancún. 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
 
Main Consequences of Climate Impacts in Africa: Strategic Interests and Regional 
Threats 
Science has become more unequivocal about global climate-related events. In Africa, 
average annual temperatures have been rising steadily and during the 20th century the 
continent saw increases of around 0.5°C. Meanwhile, countries in the Nile Basin had an 
increase of around 0.2°C to 0.3°C per decade during the second half of the century, while 
in Rwanda temperatures increased by 0.7°C to 0.9°C. Climate models project that across 
the entire continent and for all seasons, the median temperature increase by the end of 
this century will be between 3°C and 4°C, roughly 1.5 times the global mean response. 
                                                 
* Programme Analyst, Energy & Environment, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the 
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2 Sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Sixth session of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the 
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Future warming is likely to be greatest over the interior of semi-arid margins of the Sahara 
and central southern Africa. 
 
In this regard, vulnerability to external factors continues to threaten the region’s ability to 
make progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Food price volatility 
has become a critical challenge for Africa to achieve food security for all. Coupled with the 
current global financial and economic crisis, these factors continue to negatively impact 
African economies. Therefore, the following key impacts of climate change threaten the 
sustainability of the gains that have been achieved in terms of MDG attainment,3 
including:4 
 
• A drop in agricultural yields of up to 50% in some countries, with the consequent 
effects on agricultural output, food security and nutrition. 
• An increase in the number of people (from 75 to 250 million) at risk from water stress. 
• An increase in the exposure to malaria. 
• An increase of between 5% and 8% in the surface area of arid and semiarid land. 
• Rising sea levels that could severely affect mangrove forests as well as coastal 
fisheries, and lead to increased severe flooding, with a potential cost of 5% to 10% of 
annual PIB. 
 
Many of the predictions for the continent were summarised by the IPCC 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), along with the potential implications for 
international climate negotiations.5 However, climate change impacts in Africa vary across 
the continent owing to its sheer size and diversity. Scientists distinguish at least seven 
climate zones in Africa (Figure 1), with varying geographical conditions:6 
 
Figure 1. Africa’s climate zones 
 
 
                                                 
3 MDG Report 2010: Assessing Progress in Africa toward the MDGs. UNECA, AU, AfDB and UNDP. 
4 See IPCC (2007), Boko et al. (2007) and UNCCD et al. (2009). 
5 See Lázaro (2010) 
6 Eriksen et al. (2008). 
Area: International Economy & Trade / Energy & 
Climate Change Programme / Sub-Saharan Africa 
ARI 173/2010  
Date: 15/12/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
A case study selection of one country from each climatic zone, adding an island state and 
a mixed region, is shown in Annex 1 to provide an overview of Africa’s climatic diversity. 
 
Policies Implemented in Africa or Foreseen for the Near Future 
Africa’s responses to climate change impacts can now be better understood against the 
backdrop of the preceding case study in various climatic zones of the continent (see 
Annex 1). A suggested approach to reviewing climate policy development in Africa is to 
look at the measures adopted in the four areas constituting the building blocks of the Bali 
Action Plan:7 (1) mitigation; (2) adaptation; (3) technology; and (4) finance. Reference will 
be made to interventions in some of the countries studied in Annex 1. In addition, it may 
be relevant to review other activities and initiatives that might have a policy or regulatory 
impact when addressing climate change. 
 
(1) Mitigation: it is important to note that the main sources of global emissions are key 
sectors relevant to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These 
key sectors include electricity and heat (29%), agriculture (14%) and land-use change and 
forestry (12%),8 with the remainder having a comparatively less direct impact on MDG 
attainment. 
 
Consequently, emission reductions in these sectors require transformation of economies 
that should be well informed. Indeed, any actions to be undertaken in Africa should be 
informed by the diverse range of national priorities of its countries, particularly for poverty 
reduction (see Box 1, for a sample of mitigation efforts in this regard): 
 
Box 1. Africa’s Climate Change Mitigation Actions at a Glance 
• Namibia and Nigeria: preparation of the Second National Communications (SNC) to the UNFCCC, 
including studies on measures to reduce emissions in the main polluting sectors, including forestry, 
and actions undertaken in this regard. 
• Namibia: the Barrier Removal to Namibia’s Renewable Energy (NAMREP) and Namibia’s Energy 
Efficiency Programme in Buildings (NEEP) projects, both executed by the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy, are being implemented to expand access to energy services to the poor and to promote the 
adoption of energy-efficient practices. In addition to climate change mitigation, the removal of policy, 
financing and cultural barriers to the use of solar energy technologies (eg, solar water heaters, solar 
water pumps and other solar home systems) is contributing to poverty reduction in rural areas that 
might not be connected to the grid. Meanwhile, more efficient energy demand-side management 
practices in urban areas are expected to address escalating energy prices and reduce the high 
dependence on energy imports. 
• Nigeria: a consultative and multi–stakeholder approach was taken in the development of the 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA), encouraging similar highly participatory and 
consensus-based processes. Nigeria has now been granted observer status in the UN-REDD 
process, with a roadmap being developed by the government to fast track designation as a full blown 
REDD+ pilot country and taking steps to establishing a National REDD Task Team. 
Source: UNDP (www.undp.org). 
 
(2) Adaptation: one of the main objectives of adaptation is to improve climate resilience, 
particularly as it impacts existing development assistance. The main purpose is to 
strengthen the capacity of national institutions to incorporate adaptive planning and 
management into development policy in an iterative manner. The focus is on anticipatory 
                                                 
7 The Bali Action Plan (BAP) or Bali Roadmap emerged from the Thirteenth session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)/Third session of 
the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Kyoto Protocol held in December 2007 in Bali 
(Indonesia). 
8 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, www.undp.org). 
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and deliberate measures. Examples of support to Africa in this area are the Africa 
Adaptation Programme (see Box 2), the Adaptation Learning Mechanism and the 
Community-based Adaptation project. 
 
Box 2. Africa’s Climate Change Adaptation Responses at a Glance 
• Africa Adaptation Programme (AAP): there has been a sustained effort to improve the alignment of 
adaptation programmes with national strategies and priorities in Africa. AAP funded by the 
Government of Japan has been instrumental in supporting a comprehensive and integrated national 
approach towards climate change adaptation. AAP is helping 20 countries in Africa to develop their 
capability to design and implement holistic climate adaptation and disaster risk-reduction 
programmes that are aligned with their national development priorities. It is a US$92 million 
programme, started in 2009 and to be completed in December 2011. The donor recipient countries 
are: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Tanzania and Tunisia.9 
• Nigeria: preparation of a National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) and a National Adaptation 
Strategy, as well as the development of a Climate Change Policy and a National Response strategy. 
A consultative and multi-stakeholder approach was taken in the development of the NAPA, 
encouraging similar highly participatory and consensus-based processes. 
Source: UNDP (www.undp.org). 
 
(3) Technology: technology transfer and capacity development need to take place 
effectively for African countries to pursue climate change mitigation actions that at the 
same time contribute to their economic development. The installation of additional 
technological capacity not only requires significant investment but also capacity 
development and technical assistance in order to support the ensuing economic 
transformation and reap the expected poverty dividends. A sample of efforts in this regard 
is summarised in Box 3. 
 
Box 3. Africa’s Climate Change Technology Transfer and Capacity Development Interventions at a 
Glance 
• Namibia: the Concentrated Solar Power Technology Transfer for Electricity Generation (CSP TT 
NAM) project, executed by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and implemented through the 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Institute (REEEI) at the Polytechnic of Namibia, aims to 
increase the renewable share of the country’s on-grid energy mix. Beyond the obvious mitigation 
impact, the technology transfer component will seek to attain this goal through a pre-commercial 
demonstration pilot plan, which should allow the promotion of domestic manufacturing, development 
of an in-country national skill-set and overall contribution to local content in the process. 
• Congo DR: several technology capacity reinforcement projects are in the pipeline for the country, as 
already identified and reported in the country’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC: 
- Pilot Electrification Project for Five Agglomerations by Solar Means in Kinshasa (US$4 million). 
- Pilot Development Installation for 50 Micro Hydroelectric Power Stations (US$361 million). 
- Firewood Plantation in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and Mbuji‐Mayi (US$22 million). 
Source: UNDP (www.undp.org). 
 
(4) Finance: a key challenge for the transformation of African economies towards low-
carbon and climate-resilient development is accessing sustainable financing to support 
the process. The challenge is at institutional, regulatory and policy development levels, 
which are required for investment to take place. It is also crucial to ensure that any 
financing mobilised actually contributes to the development of the national priorities of 
African countries. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Countries included in the case study selection of the preceding section are shown in bold type. 
Area: International Economy & Trade / Energy & 
Climate Change Programme / Sub-Saharan Africa 
ARI 173/2010  
Date: 15/12/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
Any success in furthering this approach will significantly contribute to poverty reduction 
and MDG achievement. Access to sustainable finance should allow Africa to control and 
direct financing consistent with the low-emission climate-resilient development strategies 
(LECRDS) of its countries. This is particularly so, considering that international climate 
financing is largely unpredictable and currently provides little guarantee of long-term 
sustainability. 
 
For instance, the fast-start finance proposed in the aftermath of last year’s Copenhagen 
climate talks (US$30 billion for 2010-12) and the US$100 billion per annum envisaged 
from 2020 onwards do not provide any assurance on the funding allocation approach or 
eligibility criteria. Meanwhile, financial mechanisms such as the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) are co-funding a range of initiatives (see Box 4) to attain global 
environmental benefits. 
 
Box 4. Africa’s Climate Change Financing Actions at a Glance: the GEF 
The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is a financial mechanism under the UNFCCC established to mobilise 
financing to address environmental sustainability and climate: 
• Congo DR: the GEF has been funding enabling activities to support the fulfilment of the country’s 
obligations to the UNFCCC. In addition, it is funding a NAPA, a capacity-building project for global 
environmental management, as well as a climate-change project in the agriculture sector focusing on 
food production security. 
• Namibia: GEF is funding adaptation (eg, pilot crops and livestock farming practices), mitigation 
(barrier removal to access off-grid renewable energy technologies, energy efficiency in buildings) and 
technology transfer (concentrated solar power for on-grid electricity generation) projects. These 
interventions are in addition to supporting enabling activities for UNFCCC commitments (eg, Second 
National Communication). 
Source: GEF (www.thegef.org). 
 
It is important to note that GEF has become a significant instrument to support African 
countries on the climate change and environment agenda. 
 
Indeed, using a project approach to bring about change from business-as-usual 
scenarios, the GEF has positioned itself as a catalytic co-financier of environmental 
projects.10 
 
However, in addition to mechanism-driven approaches, other countries are using country-
driven approaches to ensure national ownership and direct access to financing. Some of 
these are briefly explained in Box 5. 
 
Box 5. Africa’s Country-Driven Approaches to Climate Financing 
• Namibia: as part of UNDP’s global project towards the ‘Capacity Development for Policy Makers to 
Address Climate Change’, the country is currently finalising its assessment of the investment and 
financial flows (I&FF) needed to meet national adaptation and mitigation costs. The I&FF process is 
contributing to a better understanding of the magnitude of funds needed to tackle climate change 
now and in the long term. The process followed relies on a multi-stakeholder approach to ensure 
national ownership. 
Source: UNDP (www.undp.org). 
 
                                                 
10 GEF’s catalytic co-financing approach means that its funding portion is normally around 10% of total project 
funding (not a fixed share, as it may vary depending on the size of the project and its global importance), with 
the majority of financing coming from donors, private sector, government, project partners, development 
banks or other relevant stakeholders. The main thrust behind GEF’s approach is financing the portion of the 
projects which will support interventions geared towards accruing incremental net benefits (for instance, from 
a business-as-usual or baseline scenario to an adaptation/mitigation scenario). 
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(5) The role of Spain and the EU: Spain has been one of the most active players in 
international development assistance in recent years. The establishment of the Millennium 
Development Goal Achievement Fund (MDG-F) between Spain and the UNDP in 
December 2006 has been a landmark instrument for bilateral contribution and joint 
programming. The MDG-F is supporting, through the UN development system, over 140 
initiatives to promote the attainment of MDGs in 49 countries to the tune of €528 million, 
with an additional €90-million contribution received in 2008. 
 
Several of these initiatives (around €68 million) are supporting countries to co-ordinate 
efforts towards environmental sustainability and climate change, with some pilot initiatives 
taking place in Africa. For instance, in Mozambique, the MDG-F is supporting processes 
for environmental mainstreaming and climate change adaptation in rural and coastal 
zones (a €6-million joint programme). 
 
Therefore, Spain is an active partner in development assistance for addressing climate 
change and broader environmental concerns, and has continued to do so during its 
Presidency of the EU. The latter earmarked €7.2 billion for 2010-12 (with €2.4 billion 
available for 2010). Meanwhile, in April 2010 Spain became the first country to make a 
voluntary contribution to the Adaptation Fund, with €45 million disbursed for 2010.11 
 
The Negotiating Position in Cancún:12 Alliances, Demands and Institutional Arrangements 
Considering Africa’s size and diversity, it is quite a complex task to summarise and 
simplify the negotiating position of the whole continent. An easy starting point is the 
positions advanced by the Africa Group, within the Group of 77+China, in the various 
negotiating areas. This would also serve as the point of departure from which various 
alliances are being formed. In turn, this would help us better understand the range of 
demands and preferred institutional arrangements by Africa, including the red lines the 
region will not cross if it is to agree on a legally-binding post-2012 regime. 
 
(1) Regional alliances: Africa has been playing a significant role in the climate-change 
negotiation process. The African Group, with its 53 member states, is the largest regional 
group (28% of all UN members).13 However, the group’s main challenge given its size has 
been defending positions suitable to its variety of members. Consistent with the preceding 
sections, which have underscored the range of climate-change impacts in Africa, and 
measures adopted to increase resilience in the continent, there is also a diversity of 
negotiating positions, in accordance with the major alliances noted in Box 6: 
 
                                                 
11 MMA (2010). 
12 Sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and Sixth session of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
13 The Africa Group is only matched by the Asian Group, with the same number of member states. 
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Box 6. Africa Regional Alliances 
• Africa (Africa Group): Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo DR, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Africa Group members also exert significant influence within the Group of 77 (eg,. South 
Africa, Nigeria and Egypt). 
• LDCs (Least Developed Countries), currently incorporating 33 African countries: Angola, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo DR, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. 
• APPA (African Petroleum Producers Association), including OPEC countries (Algeria, Angola, Libya 
and Nigeria) alongside 12 other African countries (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Congo DR, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Republic of the Congo, South Africa and Sudan). 
• SADC (Southern African Development Community), with 15 member states that are trying to exert 
influence of their own within the African Group (Angola, Botswana, Congo DR, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). Several member countries are currently negotiating for SADC to 
form another negotiating group within Africa at the UNFCCC. Similar moves are currently unknown 
from other existing regional alliances (eg, ECOWAS, CEMAC, EAC). 
• COMIFAC (Central African Forest Commission): at present including 10 forested nations in Africa 
(Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Congo DR, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and São Tomé & Príncipe). 
• SIDS (Small Island Development States): at present including six African countries (Cape Verde, 
Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, São Tomé & Príncipe and Seychelles). 
• BASIC (ie, Brazil, India and China plus South Africa). 
 
Both LDCs and SIDS can be considered the most vulnerable, whereas South Africa, 
Nigeria and Egypt (all part of APPA) are the continent’s economic powerhouses. 
However, the level of power and influence of these alliances depends on the negotiating 
demand or issue at stake, with COMIFAC countries playing a progressively responsible 
role in issues such as mitigation actions related to forests and land use, and SADC 
countries seeking to exert more strategic influence in the overall African group position. 
However, it should be noted that the diversity of positions was not as marked prior to the 
Bali road map to Copenhagen. 
 
(2) Main African demands: the proposed framework for analysis of African demands is in 
line with the main areas of the Bali Action Plan (mitigation, adaptation, technology and 
finance), and the shared vision for long-term cooperation action. It is within these areas 
that issues such as commitments by African countries vis-à-vis developed economies, 
positions on land use, land-use planning, conservation and forestry (LULUCF), sectoral 
and market mechanisms, capacity building and other response measures can be better 
understood. Overall, there is agreement that these demands might not be met in Cancun. 
Meanwhile, Africa will push for a deal to be agreed on African soil (COP-17/MOP7 in 
South Africa);14 however, significant progress will be required during and after Mexico, so 
that a package with advances in all areas may be agreed upon. 
 
                                                 
14 Seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)/Seventh session of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Mitigation: the Copenhagen Accord provided for quantified economy-wide emissions 
targets for 2020 by developed countries.15 The vision was to further strengthen the 
emissions reductions initiated by the Protocol. Meanwhile, developing countries would 
undertake national appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) in the context of their 
sustainable development, with LDCs and SIDS allowed to undertake voluntary actions on 
the basis of external financial support. The African group has clearly said that mitigation 
commitments by developed countries must be resolved urgently. Progress in other 
negotiating areas will be rendered insufficient if a legally-binding outcome does not 
emerge from the negotiating sessions with a clear post-2012 regime in terms of 
commitments. 
 
While developed countries acknowledge that greater ambition is needed on their part, 
disagreement remains on the form of commitments (eg, relative reductions, baseline 
years); the role of offset mechanisms, including Land Use, Land Use Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF), towards commitments; and the inclusion of Annex I parties not 
currently subject to the Kyoto Protocol (eg, the US). In the meantime, further technical 
guidance is required for other mitigation actions relevant to Africa, ie, REDD+ (eg, 
particularly for COMIFAC member states). For instance, there is a consensus on the need 
to provide social and environmental safeguards for forest-dependent communities 
(including indigenous people) for REDD+ to succeed. 
 
Adaptation: the African group demands that developed countries assume their historical 
responsibilities by prioritising adaptation actions for the most vulnerable. Africa’s main 
contention is that it has contributed the least to climate change, following decades of 
greenhouse gas concentrations caused by industrialised nations. However, the continent 
is the most vulnerable to its consequences and has the least capacity to adapt. 
 
Meanwhile, mechanisms to address revenue losses have been demanded by APPA 
countries, opposed to by SIDS. Namely, oil exporters (such as Nigeria from the case 
study selection) call for the inclusion of compensation for economic losses within any 
adaptation support. Again, the demand relates to expected mitigation actions in 
developed countries (ie, a reduced reliance on fossil fuels and a transition to non-fossil or 
renewable energies). However, island states like Mauritius (also in the case study 
selection) demand that any economic compensation be primarily devoted to support 
adaptation. 
 
Technology: as a cross-cutting element of the negotiations, Africa is placing great 
emphasis on progress in climate-change technology transfer and capacity building. 
Current negotiations are mostly engaged in the institutional arrangements required for an 
international technology framework to play an effective role in addressing climate change. 
Beyond that, Africa and most developing countries are concerned with the issue of 
intellectual property rights (IPR). 
 
Effective technology transfer, particularly in a North-South context, requires the building of 
IPR provisions into any proposed technology mechanism. While developed countries 
refuse such a proposal, Africa’s counterargument is that mitigation actions in developing 
countries are unlikely to take place without an increase in the installed technological 
capacity of its economies. Apart from infrastructure capacity, the processes of knowledge 
                                                 
15 See Lázaro (2010) for a summary of commitments and agreed individual and joint reductions by various 
countries resulting from the Accord. 
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sharing, skills development and overall human resource strengthening are crucial for 
Africa to benefit from any investment flows to address climate change in its economies. 
 
Finance: One of the landmark outcomes of COP-15 in Copenhagen was the pledge of 
US$30 billion for developing countries for 2010-12. While the pledge may address some 
of the Africa Group demands, the fast-start finance proposal still does not provide 
financing arrangements for a post-Kyoto regime beyond 2012. Another test for this pledge 
is to prove that any sources of climate financing put forward are actually new and 
additional to existing development assistance. 
 
The incentives arising from carbon credits are creating an enabling environment for the 
establishment of promising linkages between the private and the public sector. These 
should now move on from their current seemingly “piloting and testing” stage, to another 
where market mechanisms are enhanced and improved under the UNFCCC convention. 
However, Africa demands that this transition is accompanied with significant pledges on 
emission reductions by developed countries first. Indeed, other developing countries16 
have expressed their caution about private sector funds altogether replacing public 
climate financing. 
 
(3) Institutional arrangements: the UNFCCC is undergoing significant pressure to 
convince all its parties that it is the adequate platform to negotiate a deal. As the new 
UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres emphasised throughout the year, there 
is a ‘need to prevent multilateralism from being seen as an endless road’. While all parties 
seem to agree in principle with the multilateral approach, there is widespread 
disagreement on the acceptance of the instruments from the Convention. 
 
Africa is pushing for a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol into a second commitment 
period. In terms of mitigation by developed countries, the African group sees the Kyoto 
Protocol as the best model to reach a legally-binding agreement and to hold industrialised 
economies accountable for their past and future GHG emissions. LDCs have stressed 
that the Protocol has established the institutional and governance structures that ‘are and 
must remain at the heart of the climate regime’.17 
 
Regarding adaptation, further guidance is required on how adaptation funding will be 
allocated and disbursed. Africa (particularly LDCs and SIDS) argue for priority access 
based on the continent’s vulnerability. With regards to technology, a three-part technology 
mechanism under the Convention has been proposed.18 The question remains as to how 
any technology institutional frameworks would be supported and resources, given the lack 
of clarity on climate financing mechanisms. The institutional arrangements for climate 
financing will largely depend on final agreement reached in terms mitigation, adaptation 
and technology. 
 
Africa is demanding additional flexibility in these instruments so that low-emitting or 
carbon-neutral nations can still benefit from them. For example, South Africa, as the 
continent’s biggest emitter, has been able to tap into the CDM market easily owing to its 
great emission reduction capacity. However, the current CDM methodology does not 
                                                 
16 For example, the ALBA group (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua & Barbuda). 
17 IISD (2010), ‘Summary of the Tianjin Climate Change Talks: 4-9 October 2010’, Earth Negotiations Bulletin. 
18 This includes: (a) a Technology Executive Committee; (b) a Climate Technology Centre; and (c) a global 
Technology Network. 
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account for the fact that the country’s coal-based electricity supply is also exported to 
other countries in the SADC region. As a result, energy importers such as Namibia, 
Zimbabwe and Lesotho are not eligible to cash-in on emission reductions from their 
neighbour, even though they are contributing to South Africa’s growing global carbon 
footprint. 
 
(4) Africa’s red lines: the African group has clearly stated that mitigation commitments by 
developed countries must be resolved urgently. Progress in other negotiating areas will be 
rendered insufficient if a legally-binding outcome does not emerge from the negotiating 
sessions with a clear post-2012 regime. 
 
The African demands noted above on the way to Cancun are fairly comprehensive, with 
common areas of agreement with the position of other developing countries. There are 
certain lines Africa will not cross and paths the continent will not follow, if it is to agree to a 
legally-binding agreement. 
 
In line with the G77+China, Africa has a firm position on resisting any mitigation action 
commitments imposed on developing countries by Annex I parties. This approach is 
informed by the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.19 It is important to 
underscore that progress in other negotiating areas will be rendered insufficient if a 
legally-binding outcome does not emerge from the negotiating sessions with a clear post-
2012 regime. Meanwhile, the continent agrees to the development of mitigation strategies 
that include NAMAs in a way that effectively capture and follow the national priorities of 
each of the countries, particularly poverty reduction and the attainment of the MDGs. 
 
Discussions around the requirement by developed countries for developing countries to 
follow international measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) procedures for 
internationally-supported NAMAs will not be entertained until developed-country 
commitments are undertaken. Africa underscores the need for international MRV 
requirements to respect national sovereignty of its countries. Most critically, Africa 
requires that Annex I countries determine an overall numeric target both in the current 
AWG-LCA and AWG-KP negotiation texts. This is due to the insufficient level of ambition, 
or willingness to comply, shown by Annex I countries in the Copenhagen Accord. 
 
The Accord shifts the emphasis from legally-binding commitments to voluntary emission 
pledges. Recently, South Africa noted that the long-term global goal for emission 
reductions is more than just a number, but also nothing without a number.20 Also, Africa 
will not pursue NAMAs unless this is accompanied with intellectual property-right sharing 
provisions to support them. The process of economic transformation to a low-carbon 
intensive path is costly in the short term for any country. Therefore, Africa feels less 
compelled to make any efforts in this regard, particularly in the current economic context. 
 
Conclusion: This paper has attempted to provide a detailed understanding of climate 
impacts in Africa. Indeed, reduced rainfall may have adverse effects in dry regions (eg, 
land degradation in northern Nigeria), but have a positive impact in humid or flood-plain 
areas (eg, a reduced incidence of malaria in Mozambique). Therefore, climate policy-
making in Africa should not only respond to general climate risks (eg, coastal 
                                                 
19 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration emerging from the 1992 UNCED ‘Earth Summit’. 
20 IISD (2010): South Africa, for the Africa Group, offered a proposal to insert a collective mid-term goal and 
then agree on a process to negotiate pledges reducing emissions by at least 40% by 2020. 
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infrastructure development against sea-level rise around Africa), but also reap the specific 
opportunities brought about by climate mitigation (eg, carbon markets for REDD+ 
initiatives in Congo DR). In the same light, the EU, and particularly Spain, should not only 
identify interventions requiring donor assistance in Africa (eg, support for crop-switching 
initiatives in rural Lesotho) but also developments making business sense (solar or wind 
technology investment in Namibia). Taking this detailed approach has also contributed to 
a better understanding of the nuances in national negotiating positions across the 
continent. Nonetheless, Africa’s overall approach to Cancún shows its focus on the next 
step in the road to a post-Kyoto climate regime (COP-17 in South Africa). It considers the 
little room provided in Mexico for a global outcome that bypasses the red lines Africa will 
not cross. 
 
Raúl Iván Alfaro-Pelico 
Programme Analyst, Energy & Environment, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 
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Annex 1. Africa’s Climate Zones: Case Study Selection 
 
(1) Tropical Rainforest 
Congo DR 
(2) Tropical Wet and Dry 
Nigeria 
(3) Tropical Dry 
Namibia 
(4) Mountain 
Tanzania 
(5) Mediterranean 
Tunisia 
(6) Middle Latitude Dry 
Lesotho 
(7) Humid Subtropical 
Mozambique 
(8) Island 
Mauritius 
(9) Mixed 
South Africa 
 
(1) Tropical Rainforest: Congo DR21 
The impacts of climate change are already noticeable throughout the country. Particularly, 
there is a persistence of excessive heat waves, violent rain, soil degradation (especially 
by furrowing erosion), a prolongation of the dry season and an increase of the drought 
sequences during the rainy seasons, as well as floods. Figure 2 shows an overall 
summary of the range of projected variations for temperature, precipitation and 
atmospheric pressure. 
 
Figure 2. Congo DR: Climatic Parameter Variation22 
Parameter 2010 2025 2050 2100 
Temperature (°C) 0.45 to 0.52 0.91 to 1.03 1.72 to 2.08 2.69 to 3.22 
Precipitation (%) 0.3 to 2.5 0.4 to 4.2 0.3 to 7.5 0.8 to 11.4 
Atmospheric pressure (hPa) ‐0.08 to 
‐0.006 
‐0.16 to ‐0.13 ‐0.29 to ‐0.25 ‐0.5 to ‐0.39 
Source: UNFCCC (2009) DRC’s SNC. 
 
Climate impacts on agriculture, among other land-use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) activities, are expected to have a direct incidence on the population’s food 
security. Indeed, the LULUCF sector is DRC’s most carbon intensive (see Table B below 
for GHG assessment). Its greenhouse gas inventory shows Congo DR’s insignificant 
contribution to global emissions and significant carbon capture/sequestration potential: 
 
Figure 3. Congo DR: CO2 Emission/Sequestration Sectoral Assessment 
Emissions (sectoral %) 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003  
CO2 emissions (Gg) 553,188 330,351 196,796 370,944  428,233 
Land use and forestry 501,889 
(91%) 
280,345 
(85%) 
147,418 
(75%) 
321,786 
(87%) 
378,708 
(88%) 
Other sectors 51,299 
(9%) 
50,006 
(15%) 
49,378 
(25%) 
49,158 
(13%) 
49,525 
(12%) 
CO2 Absorption/Sequestration (Gg) 
Land use and forestry  ‐548,068 ‐562,679 ‐500,357 ‐496,999  ‐495,334 
Net assessment 5,120 ‐232,328 ‐303,561 ‐126,055  ‐67,101  
Source: UNFCCC (2009) DRC’s SNC. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 UNFCCC (2009) Democratic Republic of Congo’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC (DRC’s 
SNC). 
22 These climate projections are based on the MAGICC-SCENGEN global circulation models, proposed by 
default by the IPCC for this part of the world. 
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(2) Tropical Wet and Dry: Nigeria23 
The IPCC’s Second Assessment Report of 1995 established a general trend of 0.2ºC-
0.3ºC rise in temperature in West Africa per decade. Nigeria’s large size and geographical 
location affords the country both wet and dry climates. The Niger Delta, the Lagos, 
Calabar and Ondo regions, belonging to the southern humid tropical zone, expect an 
increase in both precipitation and temperature. 
 
Expected climate impacts include shift of optimal crop conditions for Nigeria’s most 
common produce (eg, millet, sorghum, sugar and maize) to less used crops (eg, wheat, 
rice and potatoes). Meanwhile, the Sudan-Sahel zone, or northern savannah area, 
expects drought persistence leading to reduced soil moisture and a further desertification 
processes, with a negative impact on the country’s large livestock numbers (eg, reduced 
pastureland and declining water resources). 
 
Finally, as the continent’s largest oil exporter, a sea level rise is projected to have adverse 
effects on offshore oil and gas production facilities, as well as along the coastal areas, 
both in terms of equipment and infrastructure maintenance. Meanwhile, electricity 
production in the north, through the Kainji hydroelectric power station on the River Niger, 
will suffer from reduced rainfall due to an expected decrease in river flow. 
 
(3) Tropical Dry: Namibia24 
Namibia is one of the driest countries in the world, with low and highly variable annual 
rainfall, and with water scarcity in a large piece of land, the least densely populated in the 
continent.25 Climate scenarios project mean annual temperature increases (depending on 
region) ranging from 2ºC to 6ºC above the 1961-90 mean temperature, coupled with 
decreases in rainfall (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Namibia: Climate Change Projections in Windhoek in Various Climate Scenarios 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2002) Namibia’s INC. 
 
With lack of water as the key limiting factor for the country’s development, already high 
solar radiation, low humidity and high temperatures is expected to lead to higher 
evaporation rates, extreme climatic conditions will directly impact 70% of Namibia’s 
                                                 
23 UNFCCC (2003a) Nigeria’s First National Communication under the UNFCCC (Nigeria’s INC). 
24 UNFCCC (2002) Namibia’s Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC (Namibia’s INC). 
25 Namibia, with a total land area of 824,268 km2 (the size of France and Germany put together) is the second 
least-densely populated country in the world after Mongolia with an approximate population of 2 million 
inhabitants. 
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population, who practise subsistence crop farming and agro-pastoralism on communal 
land. Climate change is also projected to have an adverse impact on the country’s 
energy-intensive and key mining sector (diamonds, uranium). 
 
Namibia’s own electricity production is primarily concentrated in the northern border with 
Angola. The Ruacana hydroelectric power plant significantly depends on the flow of the 
Kunene River,26 expected to become drier, thereby leading to curtailed electricity 
generation. Meanwhile, sea level rise and warming-up of its Benguela current system can 
negatively impact Namibia’s fishing sector, ie, its second foreign-currency earner (after 
mining), and with the third-largest output (after both mining and agriculture). Apart from 
the impact on the coastal infrastructure and declines in pilchard stocks, the effects might 
be extended to other marine resources. 
 
(4) Mountain: Tanzania27 
Climate-change projections for Tanzania point to rises in temperature and increases in 
rainfall in high altitude areas (with decreases in other areas). The impact of these changes 
will be noticeable in vulnerable sectors of the economy (agriculture, water resources, 
forestry and livestock). The severity of the impact will depend on the area, with the focus 
on the mountain climate of the highlands, eg, Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Rungwe (see 
Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Tanzania’s topography 
 
Source: Wikipedia.28 
 
High-altitude zones may suffer an increase in the occurrence of diseases and pests as a 
result of higher temperatures and increased rainfall. Maize yields are expected to be 
reduced by 33% around the country. In the meantime, areas getting less rainfall than 
normal (in the plateau zone) will require a switch to drought-resistant crop varieties due to 
evapo-transpiration. 
 
(5) Mediterranean: Tunisia29 
Tunisia’s location at the junction of the West and East Mediterranean sea, and north of 
the Sahara, gives the country a mixture of Mediterranean, semi-arid and desert-arid 
                                                 
26 Namibia’s electricity demand roughly doubles its in-country generating capacity –Ruacana (249 MW 
capacity), Van Eck (120 MW) and Paratus (46 MW)–, thus also relying on imports (mainly from South Africa). 
27 UNFCCC (2003b) United Republic of Tanzania’s Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC. 
28 Tanzania’s Topography (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tanzania_Topography.png). 
29 UNFCCC (2001) Tunisia’s Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC. 
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climates. The main focus of the present case study selection is on the former, 
characterised by a hot and dry summer, and a relatively mild and rainy winter. 
 
An accelerated sea-level rise poses the biggest threat to the economic development of 
the country, with potential adverse effects on any sector related to the sea or the coast. 
On the basis of the six climate scenarios from the IPCC, an elevation of the sea level from 
38 to 55 cm will occur, thereby affecting the coastal natural and fitted infrastructure of the 
country’s 1,300 km-long coast. 
 
(6) Middle Latitude Dry: Lesotho30 
Lesotho is a small landlocked country that experiences harsh climatic conditions. With a 
resource-poor economy and high levels of environmental degradation, including soil 
erosion, the growing season for many crops is very limited. Climate scenarios predict a 
warmer temperature (Figure 6) and lower precipitation, with a drastic water stress and 
scarcity prospects. 
 
Figure 6. Lesotho’s temperature change scenarios 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2000a) Lesotho’s FNC. 
 
These conditions will have a severe impact on households and livestock, given the rain-
dependent crop yields and the country’s heavy dependence on food imports to satisfy 
local demand. Meanwhile, Lesotho’s freedom from climate-related diseases, such as 
those in the tropics (eg, malaria), is projected to shift given drier conditions, with an 
increased incidence of respiratory infections (eg, tuberculosis). 
 
(7) Humid Subtropical: Mozambique31 
Mozambique’s tropical climate is characterised by two main seasons: one hot and rainy 
(October-April) and the other cold and dry (May-September). Extreme events (floods, 
droughts and tropical cyclones) around the country and sea-level rises on its 2,515 km-
long coast line (the third largest in Africa) pose serious threats to the country (eg, flooding 
of low coastal areas, aggravation of coastal erosion, soil erosion, reduction of agricultural 
production and a decrease of nutritional value of plants impacting livestock). In addition to 
the economic impact, longer lasting floods will increase the incidence of malaria, amongst 
other health issues (Figure D). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 UNFCCC (2000a) Lesotho’s First National Communication to the UNFCCC (Lesotho’s FNC). 
31 UNFCCC (2003c) Mozambique’s Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC (Mozambique’s INC). 
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Figure 7. Mozambique’s malaria projections 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2003c) Mozambique’s INC. 
 
(8) Island: Mauritius32 
Small island states are highly vulnerable to climate change, particularly to sea-level rise. 
In addition to the natural catastrophic effects, the economic impact on sectors dependant 
on coastal and water resources is significant. 
 
Mauritius is no exception to these impacts. The effects will be pronounced due to natural 
phenomena (ie, tropical cyclones and tidal waves) or human-induced (anthropogenic) 
activities (eg, infrastructure development, sand removal, hazardous construction and 
poorly designed jetties and harbour facilities). 
 
According to the IPCC, an accelerated sea-level rise is expected to worsen these 
problems with sea level expected to rise between 15-95 cm (some scenarios in Mauritius 
project rises from 50 cm to 2m). Apart from the expected land loss, beaches will be 
eroded (with adverse impacts on the country’s tourism industry), coral reefs will become 
degraded and wetlands be lost. 
 
(9) Mixed: South Africa33 
South Africa represents a mixture of at least five climate zones (see Figure 1): (1) humid 
subtropical; (2) tropical dry; (3) middle latitude dry; (4) mountain; and (5) Mediterranean. 
Overall climate projections for the country in the next 50 years predict 1ºC-3ºC 
temperature increases from current levels, broad reductions of 5%-10% of current rainfall 
(though with regional variations depending on the zone) and a general extension of 
summer season characteristics. 
 
The impact of the expected climatic conditions also varies depending on location. 
However, general predictions point to an increase in the occurrence of respiratory and 
skin-related illnesses (eg, strokes, dehydration, skin rashes and non-melanoma skin 
cancers). In addition, the extension of summer months is expected to result in the 
increase of malaria-prone areas and periods, particularly on the humid coastal regions of 
the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the overall expected reduction in the amount or reliability 
of rainfall, coupled with an increase in evaporation from increasing warming, is expected 
to exacerbate South Africa’s water availability concerns. Water scarcity will directly impact 
on the country’s maize production. 
                                                 
32 UNFCCC (1999) Mauritius Initial National Communication to UNFCCC. 
33 UNFCCC (2000b) South Africa’s Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC (South Africa’s INC). 
Area: International Economy & Trade / Energy & 
Climate Change Programme / Sub-Saharan Africa 
ARI 173/2010  
Date: 15/12/2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 17
Meanwhile, global climate change concerns, as well as responses to it, will have an 
incidence on South Africa’s mineral exports (eg, coal, diamonds and uranium). The 
implementation of mitigation measures in industrialised countries may be, on the one 
hand, positive (with the shift from fossil-fuel energy production from the North to the 
South), and negative (with a decrease of energy imports from these same countries). 
South Africa needs to carefully manage the expected increase of greenhouse gas 
emissions fuelling its growth (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. South Africa: GHG emissions 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2000b) South Africa’s INC. 
 
